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Abstract—Device-to-device (D2D) communication raises new
transmission secrecy protection challenges, since conventional
physical layer security approaches, such as multiple antennas
and cooperation techniques, are invalid due to its resource/size
constraints. The full-duplex (FD) jamming receiver, which radi-
ates jamming signals to confuse eavesdroppers when receiving the
desired signal simultaneously, is a promising candidate. Unlike
existing endeavors that assume the FD jamming receiver always
improves the secrecy performance compared with the half-duplex
(HD) receiver, we show that this assumption highly depends
on the instantaneous residual self-interference cancellation level
and may be invalid. We propose an adaptive jamming receiver
operating in a switched FD/HD mode for a D2D link in random
networks. Subject to the secrecy outage probability constraint,
we optimize the transceiver parameters, such as signal/jamming
powers, secrecy rates and mode switch criteria, to maximize
the secrecy throughput. Most of the optimization operations
are taken off-line and only very limited on-line calculations are
required to make the scheme with low complexity. Furthermore,
some interesting insights are provided, such as the secrecy
throughput is a quasi-concave function. Numerical results are
demonstrated to verify our theoretical findings, and to show its
superiority compared with the receiver operating in the FD or
HD mode only.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, device-to-device (D2D)
communication, stochastic geometry, full-duplex (FD), secrecy
outage, secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of wireless communications has aroused ex-
tensive attention in recent years with the boom of mobile
communication devices use and the flexibility of wireless net-
works interconnection. Physical layer security, which exploits
the randomness of wireless channels to safeguard wireless
communications, has been studied as a complement to con-
ventional cryptography techniques [1]-[4]. The basic principle
for the physical layer security approaches is to ensure that
the equivalent channel of the legitimate receiver is “better”
than that of the eavesdropper, to guarantee a positive secrecy
capacity. Following this idea, two promising approaches, i.e.,
multiple-antenna technologies and cooperation/relay technolo-
gies, have been widely adopted to achieve this goal, such
as multi-antenna beamforming [5], [6], artificial noise as-
sisted methods [7], [8], cooperative beamforming [9], [10],
cooperative jamming [11], [12], and some hybird schemes
[13], [14]. However, in many scenarios, multiple antennas
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are unavailable due to the size and complexity constraints
of the transmitter, and cooperative schemes (related to node
mobility, synchronization and trustworthiness [15]-[17]) are
also overhead-demanding due to their distributed feature.
Device-to-device (D2D) communication in Internet of Things
(IoT) applications is such a typical scenario [18]-[20], where
D2D pairs, such as sensors, are usually equipped with a single
antenna each and could not cooperation. In these scenarios, the
proposed schemes employing multiple antennas or cooperation
no longer apply. Thus, protecting information from leakage
still remains challenging in the physical layer.
Fortunately, the progress of developing full duplex (FD)
radios opens a new window in the aforementioned scenarios
[21]-[23]. The critical challenge in implementing such an FD
node is the presence of self-interference (SI) that leaks from
the FD node’s output to its input. Owing to the evolution of
SI cancelation techniques, SI can be suppressed in the spacial
domain [24], digital circuit domain [25] and analogy circuit
domain [26], respectively1. The receiver of a D2D pair, a
data collector for example, can predominantly improve the
security of the communication link by simultaneously sending
a jamming signal when receiving the confidential signal from
the transmitter. The jamming signal is able to disturb the
eavesdropper from wiretapping while it can be eliminated by
the SI procedure at the FD receiver itself. In such a way,
physical layer secrecy performance is improved. We refer
to this idea as the FD jamming receiver in this paper. As
the FD transceiver becomes implementation practical, the FD
jamming receiver scheme turns to be an alternative physical
layer security approach for D2D applications.
The FD jamming receiver has already been reported and
discussed from secrecy metrics [27], [28], resource allocations
[29]-[31], and transmission designs [32]-[35], etc. Among
these endeavors, only [27] and [31] have focused on the single-
antenna scenario and could be applied in D2D communications
with resource/size constraints. However, the assumption that
the instantaneous channel state information (ICSI) of a wiretap
channel is perfectly known by legitimate nodes in [31] is
difficult to realize, since the eavesdropper is usually passive.
Furthermore, the works mentioned above ignore the scenarios
in the presence of multiple malicious eavesdroppers.
When multiple eavesdroppers exist, the secrecy perfor-
mance strongly relies on the randomly spatial positions of
the eavesdroppers and the propagation large-scale path losses.
1With the analog SI cancellation and digital SI cancellation, an FD design
would provide a total of 110 dB SI cancellation at most [36]. The typical SI
would be −87 dBm at least for relay systems, small cell systems and D2D
communication [36], [37].
2By utilizing the framework of stochastic geometry theory and
Poisson point process (PPP) [38]-[40], studies on physical
layer security with the FD jamming receiver against random
eavesdroppers have been carried out in [41], [42]. The anal-
ysis of network-wide secrecy performance, such as the area
secure link number and the network secrecy throughput, have
been focused on in [41] and [42], where no specific secure
transmission scheme has been proposed.
All of the above investigations made a fundamental as-
sumption by default, that the FD jamming receiver improves
the secrecy performance unconditionally compared with the
conventional HD receiver. However, we point out that this
conclusion actually highly depends on the efficiency of the
SI suppression, i.e., the value of the instantaneous SI channel
gain. We note that the instantaneous SI channel is usually
modeled as a Nakagami-m [23], [43], Rayleigh [24], [44], or
Ricean [26], [45] random variable. With a high SI channel
gain, the residual SI at the receiver is probably larger than
jamming signals received at the eavesdroppers after a large
scale fading of the wiretap channels. In such a situation,
the overall effect of FD jamming is negative to the secrecy
performance, and the receiver in a half-duplex (HD) mode is
better than it in an FD mode. It implies that an adaptive FD
jamming receiver should be utilized according to the SI can-
celation level, i.e., the receiver will adaptively switch between
an FD mode (transmit jamming when receiving signal) and
an HD mode (stop transmitting jamming) . It will obviously
outperform the existing pure FD jamming strategy.
Furthermore, for a D2D transmitter with limited hardware
and power resources, a full adaptive receiver with on-line
transmission parameter optimization ability according to all
ICSIs is very difficult with on board calculation ability, if not
impossible. Therefore, a low complexity adaptive FD jamming
scheme is an interesting and effective approach to improve the
secrecy of a D2D link, which motivates this work. To the best
of our knowledge, no prior work has considered this.
A. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we propose a low complexity adaptive jam-
ming receiver operating in a switched FD/HD mode according
to the instantaneous residual SI channel gain for a D2D
link, coexisting with PPP distributed random eavesdroppers.
The novelty and main contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
1) For the first time, we propose an adaptive switched
FD/HD jamming receiver secure strategy according to the
residual SI channel gain. We optimize a threshold as the
mode switch criteria, and design transmission schemes for
each mode with the low complexity constraints of D2D nodes
under consideration.
2) In both modes, the optimal transceiver parameters, such
as the signal power, secrecy rates, and jamming power, to
maximize the secrecy throughput under the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) constraint is optimized off-line. Only very
limited calculation should be taken on-line to keep computa-
tional complexity low. Explicit optimization solutions to the
two cases are provided.
3) We provide new insights into the secure transmission
design in both modes. Numerical results show that the secrecy
throughput of the proposed strategy is superior to those of
schemes with a single receiver mode each.
B. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the system model and propose an adaptive
switched FD/HD jamming receiver secure strategy. In Section
III, we provide the SOP. In Section IV, we solve optimization
problems of secrecy throughput maximization under the SOP
constraint for each mode. In Section V, we design an adaptive
switched FD/HD jamming receiver transmission scheme with
off-line and on-line parts. Numerical results are presented in
Section VI, and Section VII concludes our work.
We use the following notations in this paper: P {·}, Fv (·)
and Ev [·] denote probability, the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of v and the mathematical expectation with respect
to (w.r.t.) v, respectively. CN (µ, σ2) and exp (λ) denote
the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2, and the exponential distribution with
parameter λ, respectively. |·| and Γ (·) denote Euclidean norm
and gamma function, respectively. log2 (·) and ln (·) denote
base-2 and natural logarithms, respectively. (·)∗,(·)† and (·)⋆
represent the optimal solutions. ∼ stands for “distributed as”.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Consider a D2D communication pair depicted in Fig. 1,
where a single-antenna transmitter (Alice) delivers confidential
information to a single-antenna legitimate receiver (Bob), in
the presence of spatially randomly located passive eavesdrop-
pers (Eves). Each of Eves is also equipped with a single
antenna. Without loss of generality, we locate Alice at (0, 0)
and Bob at (dAB , 0) in polar coordinates as shown in Fig. 1(b).
We model the positions of Eves,
{
ek : (dAk, θk) ∈ R2
}
, as a
homogeneous PPP Φ of intensity λe. The distance between
Bob and the k-th Eve, dBk, satisfies d
2
Bk = d
2
AB + d
2
Ak −
2dABdAk cos θk.
For FD Bob, it has the ability to transmit a jamming
signal to degrade the quality of the wiretap links while
simultaneously receiving the desired signal. The FD mode
leads to a feedback loop channel from Bob’s output to its
input through the channel
√
ρhBB shown in Fig. 1(a), where
ρ ∈ [0, 1] models the effect of SI suppression in the spacial
domain [22], [32] and hBB represents the SI channel fading.
The value of ρ corresponds to different SI suppression levels,
where ρ = 0 refers to perfect SI suppression and ρ = 1 means
no SI suppression. We will show that the SI suppression level
affects the secrecy performance of the FD jamming receiver
significantly, i.e., FD mode Bob is not always beneficial to the
system security compared with HD mode Bob. To prevent SI
from covering the desired signal, Bob switches to operate in
the HD mode, i.e., to stop transmit jamming, when the residual
SI channel gain is still sufficiently large.
Let hAB denote the channel fading between Alice and Bob.
hAk and hBk denote the channel fading from Alice and Bob
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Fig. 1: System model with switched FD/HD mode Bob against
randomly located Eves.
to the k-th Eve, respectively. All of the wireless channels
undergo quasi-static Rayleigh fading, and hAB, hBB, hAk and
hBk are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with
zero mean and unit variance [24], [25], i.e., obeying CN (0, 1).
The legitimate channel, the wiretap channels and the jamming
channels are assumed to suffer from large scale path losses
governed by an exponent α ≥ 2. In addition, we assume that
the ICSI of Bob is perfectly known by Alice, and the channel
state distribution information (CSDI) of Eves is available 2.
The signal received at Bob and the k-th Eve is expressed by
yB =
√
PAhABd
−α
2
AB sA +
√
PB
√
ρhBBsSI + nB, (1)
yk =
√
PAhAkd
−α
2
Ak sA +
√
PBhBkd
−α
2
Bk sB + nk, (2)
where PA and PB are the transmit power of the confidential
message sA and jamming signal sB with E
[
|sA|2
]
= 1 and
E
[
|sB |2
]
= 1, respectively. sSI with E
[
|sSI |2
]
= 1 is the
residual SI noise after SI mitigation in the circuit domain [46],
[47]. nB ∼ CN
(
0, σ2B
)
and nk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2E
)
represent the
noise at Bob and the k-th Eve, respectively.
We consider a wiretap scenario where non-colluding Eves
individually decode messages. Hence, the wiretap channel ca-
pacity depends on the Eve with the strongest wiretap channel.
The capacities of the main channel and of the wiretap channels
are then calculated as
CB = log2 (1 + ϕB) , (3)
CE = log2 (1 + ϕE) , (4)
2These assumptions are generic in literature on physical layer security,
as referred to [41], [42].
where ϕB ,
PAγABd
−α
AB
σ2
B
+ρPBγBB
and ϕE , max
PAγAkd
−α
Ak
σ2
E
+PBγBkd
−α
Bk
denote the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the
main channel and of the equivalent wiretap channel, respec-
tively, with γAB , |hAB|2, γBB , |hBB|2, γAk , |hAk|2
and γBk , |hBk|2. We should note that with PB = 0, (1)-(4)
represent the parameters of HD Bob.
B. Secure Transmission Scheme
The well-known Wyner’s wiretap encoding scheme is uti-
lized with the codeword rate RC and the secrecy rate RS .
If the main channel can support RC , i.e., CB ≥ RC , Bob
can recover the secret message, and the connection is reliable.
If the capacity of the wiretap channels, CE , exceeds the
redundant rate RC−RS , perfect secrecy is compromised, and
a secrecy outage event occurs.
To avoid an undesired connection outage, i.e., CB < RC ,
or an intolerable high secrecy outage, i.e., CE ≥ RC −RS ,
we propose the on-off transmission strategy for Alice. Alice
transmits only when γAB is not below a preset threshold µA,
otherwise it keeps silent. Specifically, the transmit power PA
at Alice is adjusted based on γAB and γBB for an FD Bob,
and only varies with γAB for HD Bob. We will see that this
transmit scheme is with very low complexity.
For FD Bob, the introduction of the jamming signal tends
to reduce CE to enhance the secrecy. When the residual
SI channel gain is large, however, the jamming signal leads
to more SI than interference to Eves, and Bob is expected
to operate in the HD mode. Therefore, we adopt a secure
transmission scheme with adaptive switched FD/HD Bob to
further safeguard the security. Bob switches between in the FD
and HD mode according to the residual SI, i.e., ργBB . When
ργBB is sufficiently small, such as ργBB = 0, FD Bob can
efficiently interfere with Eves while suffering little SI. With
the increasing ργBB , however, the SI of the FD Bob rises
while the jamming to Eves stays unchanged for realization of
channels γAB , γAk and γBk. When ργBB is large enough, Bob
is expected to work in the HD mode to protect the confidential
signal against SI. Therefore, a threshold µB of ργBB exists,
where Bob operates in the FD mode when ργBB < µB and
in the HD mode when ργBB ≥ µB .
For a given µB , we thus have two groups of pa-
rameters, i.e.,
{
RFDC , R
FD
S , µ
FD
A , P
FD
A , PB
}
with FD Bob
and
{
RHDC , R
HD
S , µ
HD
A , P
HD
A
}
with HD Bob. Owing to
the hardware and software constraints of the D2D pair,
RFDC , R
FD
S , µ
FD
A and R
HD
C , R
HD
S , µ
HD
A are expected to be
optimized off-line and be fixed when transmission takes place,
respectively. Bob transmits with an unchanged PB in the FD
mode and with PB = 0 in the HD mode. In addition, P
FD
A
could be adjusted w.r.t. the ICSIs γAB and γBB , while P
HD
A
varies with γAB .
Remark 1: The proposed scheme adopts a fixed PB for
the FD mode rather than adjustable w.r.t. the ICSIs γAB and
γBB . Since in the latter case, the accurate optimum solutions
to the above two groups of parameters are hard to obtain
and they should be solved numerically on-line at any channel
realization of γAB and γBB , which seems impractical for a
D2D communication pair.
4Remark 2:
{
RFDC , R
FD
S , µ
FD
A
}
,
{
RHDC , R
HD
S , µ
HD
A
}
and
µB can be optimized and obtained off-line, which will be
shown in the following sections. This greatly reduces the
complexity and enhances the operability of our proposed
switched FD/HD mode receiver secure strategy.
C. Performance Metrics
The SOP 3 for a given γAB is defined as
Pso (γAB) , P {CE > RC −RS |γAB} , ∀γAB ≥ µA. (5)
To evaluate the average secrecy transmission capacity, we
define the secrecy throughput with the fixed RS as
Ωs , RSPtPc, (6)
where Pt , P {γAB ≥ µA} and Pc ,
P {CB ≥ RC |γAB ≥ µA} are the transmission probability
of the On-Off scheme, and the conditional connection
probability, respectively.
In the following, we optimize the switched FD/HD Bob to
maximize the secrecy throughput under the SOP constraint.
We start with the analysis of the SOP.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We evaluate the SOP and derive a closed-form approximated
expression for the SOP in this section. We first give the
CDF of the SINR ϕE of the equivalent wiretap channel in
the following lemma, which would be extensively used in
subsequent discussions.
Lemma 1: The CDF of ϕE is given by
FϕE (x) = exp
(
− λe
2
∫ 2π
0
∫ +∞
0
(
PB
PA
dαAk
dαBk
x+ 1
)−1
× exp
(
−σ
2
E
PA
dαAkx
)
dd2Akdθk
)
. (7)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Owing to the double integrals where dBk is a function
of dAk and θk in (7), it is not easy to obtain compact
expressions for FϕE and the SOP Pso related to FϕE . Note
that, to guarantee a reliable communication and to prevent
Alice from being overheard, the distance between a D2D pair,
dAB , is usually small in most applications, such as 0− 0.2m
in Near Field Communications (NFC) systems, 0 − 10m in
Ultra-wideband (UWB) systems, and 0 − 30m in ZigBee
and Bluetooth systems [20], [48]. Therefore, we resort to an
asymptotic analysis by considering a small dAB regime as
referred to [41] and provide a concise approximation for FϕE ,
which facilitates the analysis of Pso as follows.
Lemma 2: Let β , 2π
α
Γ
(
2
α
)
. In the small dAB regime, FϕE
in (7) is approximated by
FϕE (x) ≈ exp
(
−βλe
(
PB
PA
x+ 1
)−1(
σ2E
PA
x
)− 2
α
)
. (8)
3It describes the secrecy outage performance under specific channel
realization, γAB , instead of the average performance.
Proof: Denoting ν (x) , d2Ak
(
σ2E
PA
x
) 2
α
and substituting
dAB → 0 into (7) yield
FϕE (x)
≈ exp
(
− πλe
(
PB
PA
x+ 1
)−1(
σ2E
PA
x
)− 2
α
×
∫ +∞
0
exp
(−ν α2 (x)) dν (x)
)
(a)
= exp
(
− 2
α
Γ
(
2
α
)
πλe
(
PB
PA
x+ 1
)−1(
σ2E
PA
x
)− 2
α
)
,
where (a) is obtained by calculating the integral w.r.t. ν (x)
using formula [49, 3.326.1]. Replacing 2π
α
Γ
(
2
α
)
by β com-
pletes the proof.
Based on results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can obtain
both theoretical and approximate expressions for the SOP
considering a small regime of dAB in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The theoretical expression for the SOP is written
as
Pso (γAB) =
1− exp
(
−λe
2
∫ 2π
0
∫ +∞
0
((
2RC−RS − 1) PBdαAk
PA (γAB) dαBk
+ 1
)−1
× exp
(
− (2RC−RS − 1) σ2EdαAk
PA (γAB)
)
dd2Akdθk
)
,
(9)
and its approximation in a small dAB regime with a closed
form is expressed by
Pso (γAB) ≈
1− exp
(
− βλe
((
2RC−RS − 1) PB
PA (γAB)
+ 1
)−1
×
((
2RC−RS − 1) σ2E
PA (γAB)
)− 2
α
)
. (10)
Proof: The results can be easily obtained by plugging the
CDF FϕE in (7) and the approximation of the CDF in (8) into
(5), respectively.
We can analyze the relationship between Pso and λe, RC ,
RS , PA, PB through either (9) or (10). We find that secrecy
outage events less likely occur when enhancing RC −RS and
PB , or reducing λe and PA.
To illustrate the validity of the given approximation method
and further to show that the approximation stays accurate even
for quite a wide range of dAB , we compare the theoretical SOP
in (9) and the approximate SOP in (10) as shown in Fig. 2.
The figure shows that in a wide range of λe with different
orders of magnitude, the theoretical SOP calculated by dAB
almost the same as the approximate SOP.
IV. THROUGHPUT-OPTIMAL PARAMETER DESIGN
In previous sections, we have analyzed the secrecy outage.
Next, we aim to maximize the overall secrecy throughput
subject to the SOP constraint with switched FD/HD Bob. The
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overall secrecy throughput is the sum of both modes. When
Bob operates in the FD mode, we adopt a group of fixed{
RFDC , R
FD
S , µ
FD
A , PB
}
, and adjust PFDA adaptively w.r.t. the
ICSIs of the main channel γAB and the equivalent wiretap
channel γBB to maximize the secrecy throughput ΩFD. When
Bob works in the HD mode, we adopt another group of
invariant
{
RHDC , R
HD
S , µ
HD
A
}
and the optimum expression for
PHDA w.r.t. the ICSI of the main channel γAB to maximize the
secrecy throughput ΩHD . Whether Bob operates in the FD or
HD mode depends on ργBB lower or higher than the operation
mode switch threshold µB . The overall secrecy throughput is
ΩFD +ΩHD .
We define ǫ ∈ (0, 1) as the upper bound of the SOP, and
PFDso and PHDso as the approximations of the SOPs for FD and
HD mode Bob, respectively. PFDso is a function w.r.t. γAB and
γBB due to P
FD
A (γAB, γBB), while PHDso is a function w.r.t.
γAB due to P
HD
A (γAB). PAmax and PBmax are denoted as
the maximum transmit power of Alice and Bob, respectively.
The optimization problem is formulated as
max ΩFD +ΩHD, (11a)
s.t. PFDso (γAB, γBB) ≤ ǫ,PHDso (γAB) ≤ ǫ, (11b)
0 < RFDS < R
FD
C ≤ log2
(
1 +
PFDA (γAB, γBB) γABd
−α
AB
σ2B + ρPBγBB
)
,
0 < RHDS < R
HD
C ≤ log2
(
1 +
PHDA (γAB) γABd
−α
AB
σ2B
)
,
(11c)
0 < PFDA (γAB , γBB) ≤ PAmax, 0 < PHDA (γAB) ≤ PAmax,
0 < PB ≤ PBmax, (11d)
µFDA > 0, µ
HD
A > 0, µB ≥ 0, (11e)
where (11b), (11c), and (11d) represent the constraints for
secrecy outage, reliable connection, power budgets of Alice
and Bob, respectively.
Owing to the reliable connection constraints, i.e., (11c),
the secrecy throughput in (6) is transformed into Ωs =
RSP {γAB ≥ µA}. Considering the switched FD/HD mode
receiver secure strategy, we thus have the concise forms of
ΩFD and ΩHD as
ΩFD , R
FD
S P
{
γAB ≥ µFDA , ργBB ≤ µB
}
(b)
= RFDS exp
(−µFDA )
(
1− exp
(
−µB
ρ
))
, (12)
ΩHD , R
HD
S P
{
γAB ≥ µHDA , ργBB > µB
}
(c)
= RHDS exp
(−µHDA ) exp
(
−µB
ρ
)
, (13)
where (b) and (c) follow from γAB ∼ exp (1) and γBB ∼
exp (1), respectively.
We notice that Ωs is a function w.r.t. µ
HD
A , R
HD
S , R
FD
S ,
µFDA and µB , which are coupled with R
HD
C , P
HD
A , R
FD
C ,
PFDA and PB due to the SOP and reliable connection con-
straints. Therefore, the objective function (11a) of the opti-
mization problem is provided as
max
µB

 max
RFDC ,R
FD
S ,PB
µFDA ,P
FD
A
ΩFD + max
RHDC ,R
HD
S
µHDA ,P
HD
A
ΩHD

 . (14)
For a given operation mode switch threshold µB , the opti-
mization problem in the HD mode can be treated as a special
case of that in the FD mode with PB = 0. Therefore, we only
need to solve the optimization problem in the latter situation,
and the optimal solutions of the former situation can be
obtained directly. In this section, we perform the optimization
procedure step by step for a given µB . The optimum µB is
solved in the next section.
For ease of notation, we omit FD from ΩFD, R
FD
C , R
FD
S ,
µFDA P
FD
A and PFDso , the optimum solutions or expressions for
which are treated as the ones for FD mode Bob by default.We
transform Ω in (12) into Ω˜ , RS exp (−µA) for a given µB .
To maximize Ω˜, we carry on the equivalent transformation:
max
RC ,RS ,µA,PA,PB
Ω˜⇐⇒ max
PB
(
max
RC ,RS ,µA,PA
Ω˜
)
. (15)
Therefore, the entire optimization procedure can be decom-
posed into two steps: We maximize Ω˜ by first optimizing
over RC , RS , µA and PA for a given PB , and then further
maximizing the result over the remaining variable PB .
A. Step 1 of the FD Case : Optimum Solutions of
{RC , RS , µA, PA} with a Given PB
Given a PB , we maximize Ω˜ over RC , RS , µA and PA.
Due to (11), a sub-optimization problem is formulated as
max
RC ,RS,µA,PA
Ω˜ = RS exp (−µA) , (16a)
s.t. Pso (γAB, γBB, RC , RS) ≤ ǫ, (16b)
0 < RS < RC ≤ log2
(
1 +
PA (γAB, γBB) γABd
−α
AB
σ2B + ρPBγBB
)
,
(16c)
0 < PA (γAB, γBB) ≤ PAmax, (16d)
µA ≥ 0. (16e)
Since Ω˜ in (16a) is a function w.r.t. RS and µA, which
are further coupled with RC and PA due to the constraints
6(16b) and (16c), the problem seems difficult to solve. Treating
µA as a function w.r.t. RC and RS , i.e., µA (RC , RS),
we first consider (16c), (16d) and obtain the expression
for PA (γAB, γBB). Then, we analyze (16b) according to
PA (γAB, γBB). We will show that the constraints in prob-
lem (16) will be transformed into an explicit constraint of
µA (RC , RS).
Owing to (16c), we know that to achieve a large RS ,
RC is accordingly adjusted to its maximum value, i.e.,
RC = log2
(
1 +
PA(γAB ,γBB)γABd
−α
AB
σ2
B
+ρPBγBB
)
. Therefore, we obtain
an expression for PA under γAB , γBB , RC and RS :
PA (γAB, γBB, RC , RS) ={
2RC−1
γABd
−α
AB
(
σ2B + ρPBγBB
)
, γAB ≥ µA (RC , RS)
0. γAB < µA (RC , RS)
(17)
Moreover, with (17) and (16d), the feasible range of
PA (γAB, γBB, RC , RS) can be expressed by
PA (γAB, γBB, RC , RS)
≤ 2
RC − 1
µA (RC , RS) d
−α
AB
(
σ2B + PBµB
) ≤ PAmax. (18)
Hence, the transmission is valid only when
µA (RC , RS) ≥ µA1 (RC) , 2
RC − 1
PAmaxd
−α
AB
(
σ2B + PBµB
)
.
(19)
On the other hand, by plugging PA (γAB, γBB, RC , RS) in
(17) into (16b), the SOP is
Pso (γAB, γBB, RC , RS) =
1− exp (−βλeG (γAB, γBB, RC , RS)) , (20)
where
G (γAB , γBB, RC , RS) =((
2RC−RS − 1)PBγABd−αAB
(2RC − 1) (σ2B + ρPBγBB)
+ 1
)−1
×
( (
2RC−RS − 1)σ2EγABd−αAB
(2RC − 1) (σ2B + ρPBγBB)
)− 2
α
. (21)
Obviously, Pso (γAB, γBB, RC , RS) monotonically decreases
w.r.t. γAB while increasing w.r.t. γBB under given RC and
RS . Since γAB ≥ µA (RC , RS) and ργBB ≤ µB , we have
max
γAB ,γBB
Pso (γAB, γBB, RC , RS)
= 1− exp
(
−βλeG
(
µA (RC , RS) ,
µB
ρ
,RC , RS
))
≤ ǫ,
i.e.,G
(
µA (RC , RS) ,
µB
ρ
,RC , RS
)
≤ τ, (22)
where τ ,
− ln(1−ǫ)
βλe
and G
(
µA (RC , RS) ,
µB
ρ
, RC , RS
)
is a
monotonic decreasing function w.r.t. µA (RC , RS) under given
RC and RS . Define G−11
(
x, µB
ρ
, RC , RS
)
as the inverse func-
tion of G
(
µA (RC , RS) ,
µB
ρ
, RC , RS
)
w.r.t. µA (RC , RS),
and we obtain
µA (RC , RS) ≥ µA2 (RC , RS) , G−11
(
τ,
µB
ρ
,RC , RS
)
.
(23)
So far, we have obtained two threshold constraints of µA,
i.e., (19) and (23). Recalling the objective function (16a), to
achieve a large Ω˜, we expect a small enough µA (RC , RS),
which is µA (RC , RS) = max {µA1 (RC) , µA2 (RC , RS)}
from (19) and (23). We discuss the two different values,
µA1 (RC) and µA2 (RC , RS), and obtain a result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: The on-off threshold µA (RC , RS) satisfies
µA (RC , RS) = µA1 (RC) = µA2 (RC , RS) . (24)
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
With this conclusion, the constraints (16b)-(16e) are equiv-
alent to (24). From (24), we have((
2RC−RS − 1)PB
PAmax
+ 1
)−1((
2RC−RS − 1)σ2E
PAmax
)− 2
α
= τ.
(25)
By plugging the threshold in (19) or (23) into (16a)
and defining Y , 2RC − 1, Z , 2RC−RS−1
2RC−1
, U ,
dαAB
PAmax
(
σ2B + PBµB
)
, the sub-optimization problem (16) is
transformed into
max
Y,Z
Ω˜ = log2
(
1 + Y
1 + Y Z
)
exp (−UY ) , (26a)
s.t.
(
Y Z
PB
PAmax
+ 1
)−1(
Y Z
σ2E
PAmax
)− 2
α
= τ. (26b)
According to (26b), Z can be treated as a function w.r.t. Y ,
i.e., Z (Y ). Thus, the problem (26) is simplified as a single
variable sub-optimization problem:
max
Y
Ω˜ = log2
(
1 + Y
1 + Y Z (Y )
)
exp (−UY ) . (27)
Although Ω˜ appears in an implicit function of Y , we can still
prove that it is quasi-concave on Y , and provide the solution
to the problem (27) in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Given a PB , the secrecy throughput Ω˜ in (27)
is a quasi-concave function [50] of Y , and the optimum Y ∗
that maximizes Ω˜ is the unique root of the following equation:(
V (Y )
PB
PAmax
+ 1
)−1(
V (Y )
σ2E
PAmax
)− 2
α
= τ, (28)
where
V (Y ) ,
1 + Y
2((1+Y )U ln 2)
−1
− 1. (29)
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
For a given PB , we can efficiently calculate Y
∗ satisfying
(28) by the bisection method, since Ω˜ is quasi-concave on
Y . Z∗ is then obtained by substituting Y ∗ into (26b) and the
maximum secrecy throughput Ω˜∗ is also obtained. We thus
have the optimum solutions R∗C = log2 (1 + Y
∗) and R∗S =
7log2
(
1+Y ∗
1+Y ∗Z∗
)
. Moreover, we obtain µ∗A from (19) or (23)
and P ∗A from (17).
In the following corollary, we further develop some insights
into the behavior of R∗C and Ω˜
∗.
Corollary 1: The optimum code rate R∗C decreases with
increasing ǫ or decreasing PAmax and λe. The maximum
secrecy throughput Ω˜∗ increases with increasing PAmax and
ǫ or decreasing λe.
Proof: Please see Appendix D.
Corollary 1 suggests that to enlarge Ω˜∗, a larger power
budget, a looser SOP constraint or a less denser distribution
of eavesdroppers should be met.
B. Step 2 of the FD Case : Optimum Solution of PB
We maximize Ω˜∗ over PB . Owing to (28), Y
∗ can be
treated as a function w.r.t. PB , i.e., Y
∗ (PB). Combining
with (26b), log2
(
1+Y ∗(PB)
1+Y ∗(PB)Z(Y ∗(PB))
)
in (27) can be replaced
by 1(1+Y ∗(PB))U(PB) ln 2 . The corresponding sub-optimization
problem is thus formulated as
max
PB
Ω˜∗ =
exp (−U (PB)Y ∗ (PB))
(1 + Y ∗ (PB))U (PB) ln 2
, (30a)
s.t. 0 < PB ≤ PBmax. (30b)
The following theorem provides the optimum P
†
B that
maximizes Ω˜∗.
Theorem 3: The secrecy throughput Ω˜∗ in (30a) is a quasi-
concave function of PB , and the optimum P
†
B that maximizes
Ω˜∗ is
P
†
B =
{
P ∗B , PBmax ≥ P ∗B
PBmax, PBmax < P
∗
B
(31)
where P ∗B is the unique root of the following equation:
̟Y ∗ (PB)W (Y
∗ (PB) , PB) (1 + V (Y
∗ (PB) , PB))
= U (PB) V
2 (Y ∗ (PB) , PB) (1 + Y
∗ (PB)) , (32)
and ̟ ,
dαAB
PAmax
µB , W (Y
∗ (PB) , PB) , ηPAmax +
(1 + η)PBV (Y
∗ (PB) , PB) with η ,
2
α
.
Proof: For ease of presentation, we omit PB from
Y ∗ (PB), W (Y
∗ (PB) , PB), V (Y
∗ (PB) , PB) and U (PB),
and treat Y ∗, W (Y ∗), V (Y ∗) and U as functions of PB by
default. We first verify that Ω˜∗ is a quasi-concave function
of PB and solve P
∗
B . Then, we compare P
∗
B with PBmax to
obtain the optimum P
†
B .
To verify that Ω˜∗ is a quasi-concave function of PB , we
are expected to derive that the second-order derivative of Ω˜∗
w.r.t. PB at the point P
∗
B , where the first-order derivative of
Ω˜∗ w.r.t. PB equals 0, is less than 0. Before giving the first-
/second-order derivative of Ω˜∗ w.r.t. PB , from (28) and (29),
we calculate dY
∗
dPB
using the implicit function derivative rule
and
dV (Y ∗)
dPB
as
dY ∗
dPB
= − 1 + Y
∗
U (1 + U (1 + Y ∗))
(
̟ +
U2V 2 (Y ∗) (1 + Y ∗)
W (Y ∗) (1 + V (Y ∗))
)
,
(33)
and
dV (Y ∗)
dPB
=
((
1 +
1
U (1 + Y ∗)
)
dY ∗
dPB
+
̟
U2
)
1 + V (Y ∗)
1 + Y ∗
.
(34)
Considering (33), the first-order derivative of Ω˜∗ w.r.t. PB
from (30a) is provided as
dΩ˜∗
dPB
=
((
̟
U
+
UV 2 (Y ∗) (1 + Y ∗)
W (Y ∗) (1 + V (Y ∗))
)
−
(
Y ∗ +
1
U
)
̟
)
Ω˜∗.
(35)
We assume there is a variable P ∗B satisfying
dΩ∗
dPB
|PB=P∗B = 0.
Thus, we obtain an equality expressed as (32). To verify that
P ∗B is the unique root of (32) and Ω˜
∗ achieves its maximum
value at P ∗B , we should consider the sign of second-order
derivative of Ω˜∗ w.r.t. PB at P
∗
B .
Considering (33), (34) and (35), we have the second-order
derivative of Ω˜∗ w.r.t. PB at P
∗
B (PB = P
∗
B has been
substituted into the following Y ∗, W (Y ∗), V (Y ∗) and U
in this proof.)
d2Ω˜∗
dPB
2 |PB=P∗B = −
Ω˜∗ (P ∗B)
W (Y ∗) (1 + V (Y ∗))
×
(
̟ (1 + η)Y ∗ (1 + V (Y ∗))H1 (Y ∗, P ∗B)
+
̟V (Y ∗)
Y ∗ (1 + (1 + Y ∗)U)
H2 (Y ∗, P ∗B)
)
, (36)
where
H1 (Y ∗, P ∗B) , V (Y ∗)−
̟Y ∗P ∗B
(1 + Y ∗)U
(1 + V (Y ∗)) ,
H2 (Y ∗, P ∗B) , 2Y ∗2 + 2Y ∗ (1 + Y ∗)U (Y ∗ − V (Y ∗))
− 2 (1 + Y ∗)V (Y ∗) + V (Y ∗) .
Clearly, the sign of d
2Ω˜∗
dPB2
|PB=P∗B is determined by the values
of H1 (Y ∗, P ∗B) and H2 (Y ∗, P ∗B).
The equality in (32) can be transformed into V (Y ∗) =
̟Y ∗W (Y ∗)
(1+Y ∗)UV (Y ∗) (1 + V (Y
∗)). With η ∈ (0, 1), we have
W (Y ∗) ≥ P ∗BV (Y ∗) from the expression for W (Y ∗). Thus,
H1 (Y ∗, P ∗B) satisfies
H1 (Y ∗, P ∗B) ≥
̟Y ∗P ∗BV (Y
∗)
(1 + Y ∗)UV (Y ∗)
(1 + V (Y ∗))
− ̟Y
∗P ∗B
(1 + Y ∗)U
(1 + V (Y ∗))
= 0. (37)
Considering the expression for V (Y ∗) in (29), we have Y ∗ >
V (Y ∗) and 1+Y
∗
1+V (Y ∗) = 2
((1+Y ∗)U ln 2)−1 . Due to lnx ≤ x−1
with x ≥ 1, the following equivalent transformation holds:
1
(1 + Y ∗)U
≤ 1 + Y
∗
1 + V (Y ∗)
− 1
⇐⇒ (1 + Y ∗)U (Y ∗ − V (Y ∗)) ≥ 1 + V (Y ∗) . (38)
Thus, H2 (Y ∗, P ∗B) satisfies
H2 (Y ∗, P ∗B) ≥ 2Y ∗ (1 + Y ∗)− V (Y ∗)
≥ V (Y ∗) (2 (1 + Y ∗)− 1) > 0. (39)
Combining (36) and (37), (39), we have d
2Ω˜∗
dPB
2 |PB=P∗B < 0.
Ω˜∗ in (30a) is a quasi-concave function of PB and achieves
its maximum value at the point P ∗B . Referring to (30b), we
compare P ∗B with PBmax. Since Ω˜
∗ first increases and then
8Algorithm 1 Off-line Part of the Switched FD/HD Receiver
Scheme
1: Input: Set dAB , λe, ρ, α, σ
2
B , σ
2
E , ǫ, PAmax, PBstep,
PBmax and µ
step
B , µ
max
B ;
2: Initialize: Niter = 1,Ωs (Niter) = 0, Nnum = 0;
3: Solve RHD∗C in (41) (bisection method), and then we
obtain Ω∗HD from (40a);
4: for µB = 0 : µ
step
B : µ
max
B do
5: for PB = 0 : PBstep : PBmax do
6: Solve RFD∗C in (28) (bisection method);
7: if RFD∗C and PB satisfy (32) then
8: Break;
9: end if
10: end for
11: Plug R
FD†
C = R
FD∗
C and P
†
B = PB into (30a) to obtain
Ω†FD;
12: Niter = Niter + 1,Ωs (Niter) = Ω
†
FD +Ω
∗
HD;
13: if Ωs (Niter) ≤ Ωs (Niter − 1) then
14: Ωs (Niter) = Ωs (Niter − 1);
15: else
16: µ⋆B = µB , P
⋆
B = P
†
B , R
HD⋆
C = R
HD∗
C , R
FD⋆
C =
R
FD†
C ;
17: end if
18: end for
19: Ω⋆s = Ωs (Niter);
20: Substitute
{
µ⋆B , R
HD⋆
C
}
and
{
µ⋆B , R
FD⋆
C , P
⋆
B
}
into the
HD and FD case, respectively.
21: Solve RFD⋆S (bisection method), R
HD⋆
S from (25),
µHD⋆A , µ
FD⋆
A from (19), and P
HD⋆
A , P
FD⋆
A from (17).
22: Output: The maximum secrecy throughput Ω⋆s
and the corresponding optimum solutions µ⋆B, P
⋆
B ,
RHD⋆C , R
HD⋆
S , µ
HD⋆
A , P
HD⋆
A , R
FD⋆
C , R
FD⋆
S , µ
FD⋆
A , P
FD⋆
A .
decreases w.r.t. PB , the optimum P
†
B is P
∗
B if PBmax ≥ P ∗B ,
or otherwise P
†
B = PBmax. The proof is completed.
With the above two-step procedure, we have solved the opti-
mization problem for FD Bob. The optimum P
†
B is obtained by
solving (32), and the maximum Ω˜† is achieved by substituting
P
†
B into Ω˜
∗. Since Y ∗ is a function of PB , we know that R
∗
C ,
R∗S , µ
∗
A and P
∗
A are functions of PB . With P
†
B , we have the
optimum solutions R
†
C , R
†
S , µ
†
A and P
†
A.
We develop some insights into Ω˜† and P †B = P
∗
B in the
following corollary.
Corollary 2: As ǫ→ 1 or λe → 0, R∗C is close to zero for
a given PB , and Ω˜
∗ decreases w.r.t. PB . Thus, the maximum
secrecy throughput Ω˜† is obtained at P †B = 0. When ǫ → 0
or λe →∞, P †B decreases with increasing ǫ or decreasing λe,
while Ω˜† is totally opposite.
Proof: Please see Appendix E.
Corollary 2 shows that when the upper bound of the SOP is
very small or the eavesdroppers are densely distributed, Ω˜† is
enhanced. In contrast, Ω˜† is obtained at PB = 0.
C. HD case
For HD Bob, considering the secrecy throughput in (13),
the optimization problem (11) is transformed into
max
RHDC ,R
HD
S ,µ
HD
A ,P
HD
A
ΩHD = R
HD
S exp
(−µHDA ) exp
(
−µB
ρ
)
,
(40a)
s.t. PHDso
(
γAB, R
HD
C , R
HD
S
) ≤ ǫ, (40b)
0 < RHDS < R
HD
C ≤ log2
(
1 +
PHDA (γAB) γABd
−α
AB
σ2B
)
,
(40c)
0 < PHDA (γAB) ≤ PAmax, (40d)
µHDA ≥ 0. (40e)
Through a similar process as Step 1, we obtain the optimum
RHD∗C as follows.
Corollary 3: The optimum RHD∗C for HD Bob is the unique
root of equation:
2R
HD
C
(
RHDC − log2
(
1 +
PAmax
σ2E
τ−
α
2
))
=
PAmax
σ2Bd
α
AB ln 2
.
(41)
Proof: Substituting PB = 0 into (28) of Theorem 2 and
replacing Y with 2R
HD
C − 1, we obtain the equation (41).
We can solve (41) to get the optimum RHD∗C by the
bisection method. RHD∗S is then obtained by substituting
RC = R
HD∗
C and PB = 0 into (26b) and replacing RS with
RHD∗S . Moreover, we have the optimum solutions µ
HD∗
A from
(19) or (23) and PHD∗A from (17), and the maximum secrecy
throughput ΩHD∗ is also obtained.
V. ADAPTIVE SWITCHED FD/HD RECEIVER SCHEME
So far we have obtained the optimum solutions when Bob
works in the FD or HD mode for a given µB , and the rest work
of (14) is to calculate the optimum mode switch threshold µB .
The optimization problem to maximize Ωs becomes a single
variable optimization problem, which is formulated as
max
µB
Ωs = Ω
†
FD +Ω
∗
HD, (42a)
s.t. µB ≥ 0. (42b)
Considering that both (28) and (32) are implicit equations,
the roots Y † (µB) and P
†
B (µB) are thus implicit and Ω
†
FD =
Ω˜†FD
(
1− exp
(
−µB
ρ
))
solved from (30a) has no explicit
formulation. Moreover, the expression for Ω∗HD resulted from
(40a) is not explicit due to the implicit root RHD∗C (µB) of
(41). The problem to maximize Ωs in (42a) should be solved
numerically by a line search over µB .
Detailed algorithms to get
{
RHD⋆C , R
HD⋆
S , µ
HD⋆
A , P
HD⋆
A
}
,{
RFD⋆C , R
FD⋆
S , µ
FD⋆
A , P
FD⋆
A , P
⋆
B
}
and µ⋆B are summarized in
Algorithm 1, in which µ
step
B and µ
max
B denote the step size
and the maximum value of µB and PBstep determines the step
size of PB . We have to emphasize that all these parameters can
be optimized off-line, and are fixed on-line except PFD⋆A and
PHD⋆A . In Algorithm 2, we provide all the on-line operations
of the proposed scheme, which consists of selecting the duplex
modes and calculating the powers PFD⋆A or P
HD⋆
A .
9Algorithm 2 On-line Part of the Switched FD/HD Receiver
Scheme
1: Input: Evaluate γAB and γBB;
2: Initialize: The transmitter and the receiver stay silent at
the beginning;
3: if γBB ≤ µ
⋆
B
ρ
then
4: if γAB ≥ µFD⋆A then
5: Substitute γAB and γBB into P
FD⋆
A . The transmitter
transmits confidential signal with power PFD⋆A , and
the receiver transmits jamming signal with power P ⋆B;
6: end if
7: else
8: if γAB ≥ µHD⋆A then
9: Substitute γAB into P
HD⋆
A . The transmitter transmits
confidential signal with power PHD⋆A , and the re-
ceiver works in the HD mode;
10: end if
11: end if
12: Loop through On-line Part until the inputs of Off-line
Part change or this scheme stops. In the former case, the
communication pair restarts executing Off-line Part.
A. Complexity Analysis
The computational consumption of the off-line optimization
mainly depends on the processes of the bisection method
and the number of loop iterations. We first analyze the
computational complexity of the three processes of the
bisection method. Denote bci (resp. b
s
i ) and b
c
p (resp. b
s
p) as
the required interval and precision to search RHD∗C /R
FD∗
C
(resp. RFD⋆S ) with the bisection method, respectively. We
need to calculate (41) at most log2
bci
bcp
times to search the null
point of it. Since the cost of calculating the value of (41)
is O (2), the cost of solving RHD∗C is o1 = O
(
2 log2
bci
bcp
)
.
Similarly, the computational complexities of solving RFD∗C
from (28) and RFD⋆S from (25) are o2 = O
(
13 log2
bci
bcp
)
and
o3 = O
(
5 log2
bsi
bsp
)
, respectively. Then, we count the number
of loop iterations, i.e., N =
(
µmaxB
µ
step
B
+ 1
)(
PBmax
PBstep
+ 1
)
.
Therefore, the computational complexity of the off-
line optimization equals about o1 + No2 + o3, i.e.,
O
(
2 log2
bci
bcp
+ 13
(
µmaxB
µ
step
B
+ 1
)(
PBmax
PBstep
+ 1
)
log2
bci
bcp
+ 5 log2
bsi
bsp
)
.
The computational consumption of the on-line operation
with specific channel realizations equals about O (1), which is
ignorable compared with the one of the off-line optimization.
B. Metrics for Comparison
To verify that the secrecy transmission scheme with a
switched FD/HD receiver is superior to which only using an
HD or FD receiver, we consider the following metrics.
We denote the secrecy throughputs for FD and HD modes
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Fig. 3: Maximum secrecy throughput Ω∗HD vs. PAmax (dBm) for
different λ′es and ǫ
′s, with ρ = µB = −70dBm.
when ργBB ≤ µB as
ΩcompFD , R
FD
S exp
(−µFDA )
(
1− exp
(
−µB
ρ
))
, (43)
ΩcompHD , R
HD
S exp
(−µHDA )
(
1− exp
(
−µB
ρ
))
, (44)
for fair comparisons. We further compare the probability of
Bob operating in the FD case and in the HD case for our
proposed scheme, which are defined as
PFD , exp
(−µFDA )
(
1− exp
(
−µB
ρ
))
, (45)
PHD , exp
(−µHDA ) exp
(
−µB
ρ
)
. (46)
In the next section, {ΩcompFD ,ΩcompHD } and {PFD,PHD} are
analyzed numerically.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present several numerical examples to
validate our theoretical analysis. In all simulation experiments,
we preset the path loss exponent α = 4, the distance between
Alice and Bob dAB = 10m, and the noise variances at Bob
and Eves σ2B = σ
2
E = −90dBm.
A. Secrecy Throughput Optimization with HD Receiver
Fig. 3 depicts the maximum secrecy throughputΩ∗HD solved
from (40a) versus the transmit power budget of Alice PAmax
for different values of λe and ǫ when Bob operates in the
HD mode for a given µB . The relationship between Ω
∗
HD and
PAmax, λe, ǫ in Corollary 1 is validated here. Ω
∗
HD increases
with the growth of small PAmax, for a reliable link is more
likely to developed between Alice and Bob. With increasing
PAmax, a secrecy outage event is more likely to occur. When
PAmax is sufficiently large, Ω
∗
HD reaches a plateau since there
is a balance between the reliable connection probability and
the secrecy outage probability.
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Fig. 4: Maximum secrecy throughput Ω
†
FD vs. PAmax (dBm) with
PBmax = 0 or 20dBm (left) and PBmax (dBm) with PAmax = −10
or 10 dBm (right), for different values of ǫ with λe = 10
−4 and
ρ = µB = −70dBm.
B. Secrecy Throughput Optimization with FD Receiver
Fig. 4 illustrates how the maximum secrecy throughput
Ω†FD solved from (30a) varies w.r.t. the transmit power budgets
PAmax and PBmax for different ǫ. Ω
†
FD increases w.r.t.
ǫ as Corollary 2 shows. Similarly to the performance of
Ω∗HD , Ω
†
FD first increases and then almost stays static with
increasing PAmax as shown in Fig. 4(a). Fig. 4(b) shows that
the maximum secrecy throughput first increases w.r.t. PBmax
since the jamming signal confuses Eves effectively. When SI
is gradually dominant, a certain PBmax exists to balance the
impact of SI and jamming to Eves and Ω†FD stays unchanged.
C. Maximum Secrecy Throughput with Switched FD/HD Re-
ceiver
Fig. 5 plots the maximum secrecy throughputs ΩcompFD and
ΩcompHD solved from (43) and (44), respectively, versus PAmax
for different values of µB . Ω
comp
FD is larger than Ω
comp
HD when
µB is small, since the jamming signal transmitted by Bob
interferes with Eves. With increasing µB , the superiority to
Bob in the FD mode first increases and then decreases as the
figure shows. ΩcompFD is smaller than Ω
comp
HD when µB is large
enough, which confirms Bob stopping jamming when SI is
dominant. For two curves of µB = −40dBm, whether ΩcompFD
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Fig. 6: Maximum secrecy throughput of three transmission schemes
vs. PAmax (dBm) for different ǫ
′s with λe = 10
−5, PBmax =
10dBm and ρ = −70dBm.
is superior to ΩcompHD depends on PAmax. We should note that
the least PB is predefined as −10dBm above, or otherwise the
optimum PB is zero for sufficiently large µB or small PAmax
and thus the FD mode degenerates into the HD mode.
Fig. 6 plots the maximum secrecy throughputs for the almost
FD Bob, almost HD Bob, and switched FD/HD Bob all solved
from our proposed scheme versus PAmax for different values
of ǫ. Obviously, the secrecy throughput with switched FD/HD
Bob is always larger than the ones for FD and HD Bob. We
should note that with µB = −40dBm and ρ = −70dBm,
i.e., γBB ≤ 103, Bob almost only operates in the FD mode
considering γBB distributed as exp (1). On the other hand,
with µB = −100dBm and ρ = −70dBm, Bob almost
operates in the HD mode only.
Fig. 7 illustrates the probability of Bob operating in the
FD mode PFD solved from (45) and in the HD mode PHD
solved from (46) of our proposed transmission scheme change
with ρ for different values of ǫ. In accordance with the former
analysis, PFD decreases with a worse suppression level of SI,
while PHD is totally opposite. Moreover, PFD decreases and
PHD increases w.r.t. ǫ.
Fig. 8 interprets how the maximum secrecy throughput
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Fig. 7: Probability of Bob operating in the FD mode PFD or the
HD mode PHD vs. ρ (dBm) for different ǫ
′s with λe = 10
−5,
PAmax = 10dBm and PBmax = 30dBm.
Ω⋆s changes with PAmax and PBmax for different values of
ǫ and ρ. Ω⋆s decreases with increasing ρ since the secrecy
performance is damaged by badly suppressed SI. As shown in
Fig. 8(a), when PAmax grows, Ω
⋆
s increases until it approaches
a static value. Furthermore, the minimum PAmax at which
Ω⋆s stays unchanged (turning point) depends on the larger
one between the two turning points’ PAmax of the secrecy
throughput for FD and HD Bob, respectively, since the ones
of Ω†FD and Ω
∗
HD are irrelevant to µB seen from Fig. 5. As
shown in Fig. 8(b), Ω⋆s increases until it approaches a static
value with the growth of PBmax. Moreover, PBmax of Ω
⋆
s’s
turning point is practically the same as the one of Ω†FD, since
PBmax is irrelevant to µB and PBmax has no impact on the
secrecy performance for HD Bob. Therefore, to enhance the
secrecy throughput, we are inspired to rationally relax upper
bound of SOP or to expand power budgets of Alice and Bob.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a low complexity adaptive
D2D secure transmission scheme with a switched FD/HD
mode jamming receiver, according to the ICSIs of the main
link and residual SI link, against PPP randomly distributed
eavesdroppers. Two groups of optimized transceiver parame-
ters for the FD and HD receiver, respectively, and the optimum
adaptive mode switch threshold to maximize the secrecy
throughput under the SOP constraint, have been obtained. The
algorithm is consisted of the off-line and on-line parts, and
the computational complexity of the on-line operations is low.
Simulation results show that the secrecy throughput increases
with the growth of budgets of transmit power and jamming
power respectively, until it monotonically reaches a plateau.
This indicates an existing balance between the reliable con-
nection probability and the SOP. Numerical comparisons on
the secrecy throughput verify the superiority of the proposed
switched FD/HD mode receiver over an FD or HD mode
receiver. Moreover, the secrecy throughput would be enhanced
with a larger suppression level of SI, sparser eavesdroppers or
a less rigorous SOP constraint.
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Fig. 8: Maximum secrecy throughput Ω⋆s vs. PAmax (dBm) with
PBmax = 10dBm (left) and PBmax (dBm) with PAmax = 10dBm
(right) for different values of ǫ and ρ with λe = 10
−5.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Considering the SINR ϕE of (4), we have
FϕE (x)
= P
{
max
PAγAkd
−α
Ak
σ2E + PBγBkd
−α
Bk
< x
}
= EΦ
[ ∏
ek∈Φ
EγBk
[
P
{
γAk < x
σ2E + PBγBkd
−α
Bk
PAd
−α
Ak
|γBk
}]]
(d)
= EΦ
[ ∏
ek∈Φ
EγBk
[
1− exp
(
−xσ
2
E + PBγBkd
−α
Bk
PAd
−α
Ak
)]]
(e)
= EΦ
[ ∏
ek∈Φ
∫ +∞
0
exp (−γBk)
×
(
1− exp
(
−xσ
2
E + PBγBkd
−α
Bk
PAd
−α
Ak
))
dγBk
]
(f)
= exp
(
− λe
∫ 2π
0
∫ +∞
0
(
1 + x
PB
PA
dαAk
dαBk
)−1
× exp
(
−xσ
2
E
PA
dαAk
)
dAkddAkdθk
)
, (47)
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where (d) and (e) follow from γAk ∼ exp (1) and γBk ∼
exp (1), respectively, and (f) holds for the probability gener-
ating functional lemma (PGFL) over PPP [51].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Case 1: If µA1 (RC) ≥ µA2 (RC , RS), we can obtain
G
(
µA1 (RC) ,
µB
ρ
, RC , RS
)
≤ τ according to µA2 (RC , RS)
in (23). Combining with µA1 (RC) in (19), we then obtain the
following inequality
((
2RC−RS − 1)PB
PAmax
+ 1
)−1((
2RC−RS − 1)σ2E
PAmax
)− 2
α
≤ τ,
(48)
and the objective function in (16a) is transformed into
Ω˜ = RS exp
(
−
(
2RC − 1) (σ2B + PBµB)
PAmaxd
−α
AB
)
. (49)
Obviously, Ω˜ in (49) is a decreasing function of RC . To have
a small RC , the left-hand side of (48) is set to its maximum
value τ , which refers to G
(
µA1 (RC) ,
µB
ρ
, RC , RS
)
= τ , i.e.,
µA1 (RC) = µA2 (RC , RS) from (23).
Case 2: If µA1 (RC) ≤ µA2 (RC , RS), we can obtain
G
(
µA1 (RC) ,
µB
ρ
, RC , RS
)
≥ τ from (23). Combining with
µA1 (RC) in (19), we then obtain the inequality
((
2RC−RS − 1)PB
PAmax
+ 1
)−1((
2RC−RS − 1)σ2E
PAmax
)− 2
α
≥ τ.
(50)
The objective function (16a) combining with µA2 (RC , RS) in
(23) is expressed by
Ω˜ = RS exp
(
−G−11
(
τ,
µB
ρ
,RC , RS
))
. (51)
We thus develop the relationship between Ω˜ and RC . The
partial derivative of Ω˜ w.r.t. RC is
∂Ω˜
∂RC
= −RS exp (−µA2 (RC , RS)) ∂µA2 (RC , RS)
∂RC
= RSµA2 (RC , RS) exp (−µA2 (RC , RS))
×
(
1
2RC−RS − 1 −
1
2RC − 1
)
ln 2. (52)
Clearly, ∂Ω˜
∂RC
> 0 and Ω˜ increases w.r.t. RC . As a
result, RC is expected to be large enough. The left-
hand side of (50) is set to its minimum value τ , which
means G
(
µA1 (RC) ,
µB
ρ
, RC , RS
)
= τ , i.e., µA1 (RC) =
µA2 (RC , RS) from (23).
Through discussions of the two cases, we obtain equations
in (24). The proof is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From (26b), we have
dZ(Y )
dY
= −Z(Y )
Y
using the derivative
rule for implicit functions. The first-order derivative of Ω˜ w.r.t.
Y in (27) is then
∂Ω˜
∂Y
= exp (−UY )
(
1
(1 + Y ) ln 2
− U log2
(
1 + Y
1 + Y Z (Y )
))
.
(53)
Assume there is a variable Y ∗ allowing ∂Ω˜
∂Y
|Y=Y ∗ = 0. That
is, Y ∗ satisfies the equality given by
1
(1 + Y ) ln 2
= U log2
(
1 + Y
1 + Y Z (Y )
)
. (54)
The second-order derivative of Ω˜ w.r.t. Y at Y ∗ is
∂2Ω˜
∂Y 2
|Y=Y ∗ = −U (1 + Y
∗) + 1
(1 + Y ∗)
2
ln 2
exp (−UY ∗) . (55)
Clearly, ∂
2Ω˜
∂Y 2
|Y=Y ∗ < 0, and Ω˜ is a quasi-concave function of
Y . Plugging (54) into (26b) finishes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
1) Relationships between R∗C , Ω˜
∗ and ǫ, λe:
Considering
dV (Y ∗)
dY ∗
= (1+V (Y
∗))(1+U(1+Y ∗))
U(1+Y ∗)2
> 0, the
left side of (28) decreases with R∗C with the other variables
unchanged. When ǫ decreases or λe increases, the left side of
(28) needs reducing, i.e., enhancingR∗C , to ensure the equality.
We thus obtain the relationships between R∗C and ǫ, λe.
From (30a), we find that the maximum Ω˜∗ for a given PB
decreases with increasing R∗C . Therefore, Ω˜
∗ increases with
increasing ǫ or decreasing λe.
2) Relationship between R∗C , Ω˜
∗ and PAmax:
Since τ is independent of PAmax, PAmax increases to
ensure the equation (28) if V (Y ∗) increases. Therefore, R∗C
increases with increasing PAmax.
According to Y ∗ > V (Y ∗) from (29), the first-order
derivative of Ω˜∗ w.r.t. PAmax satisfies
dΩ˜∗
dPAmax
=
(Y ∗ − V (Y ∗)) exp (−UY ∗)
(1 + V (Y ∗)) (1 + Y ∗)PAmax ln 2
> 0. (56)
We verify that Ω˜∗ increases w.r.t. PAmax.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
1)When ǫ → 1 or λe → 0: Referring to 1) in Appendix
D, the optimum Y ∗ is close to zero, and thus the secrecy
throughput Ω˜∗ → 1
U ln 2 from (30a) decreases w.r.t. PB .
2)When ǫ→ 0 or λe →∞: We find V (Y ∗)PB ≫ 1 from
(28), where V (Y ∗) increases with Y ∗ and PB according to
(29) and 1) in Appendix D. If PB ≫ 1, V (Y ∗)→ Y ∗ and the
equality in (32) is transformed into ̟W (Y ∗) = UV (Y ∗).
If V (Y ∗) ≫ 1, Y ∗ ≫ 0 and we also have ̟W (Y ∗) =
UV (Y ∗) from (32). Therefore, in such a limiting case, we
have
V (Y ∗)
PAmax
=
1
σ2
B
ηµB
− PB
. (57)
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Substituting (57) into (28), we obtain

 PB
σ2
B
ηµB
− PB
+ 1


−1
 σ2E
σ2
B
ηµB
− PB


− 2
α
= τ. (58)
P ∗B is the unique root of above equality and decreases with ǫ
while increasing with λe. Hence, the the first-order derivative
of Ω˜† w.r.t. P †B is written as
dΩ˜†
dP
†
B
= −
(
− ̟
U †
+
U †V 2
(
Y †
) (
1 + Y †
)
PAmax (1 + V (1 + Y †))
+
̟
U †
+̟Y †
)
× exp
(−U †Y †)
U † (1 + Y †) ln 2
< 0. (59)
The limiting secrecy throughput Ω† decreases with P †B here
and we complete the proof.
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